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A Government of 
Limited Powers 
by Carl E. Schneider 
scoe C. Filburn owned a small 
arm in Ohio where he raised 
oultry, dairy cows, and a mod-
est acreage of winter wheat. Some wheat 
he fed his animals, some he sold, and 
some he kept for his family's daily 
bread. The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938 limited the wheat Mr. Filburn 
could grow without incurring penalties, 
but his 1941 crop exceeded those limits. 
Mr. Filburn sued. He said Claude 
Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
could not enforce the AAI\s limits be-
cause Congress lacked authority to reg-
ulate wheat grown for one's own use. 
He reasoned: In our federal system, the 
states have authority to legislate except 
where the Constitution constrains 
them, but the federal government may 
legislate only where the Constitution 
authorizes it. The Constitution permits 
Congress to "regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several 
States" and may "make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution" its Commerce 
Clause powers. Mr. Filburn thought 
that growing and eating wheat on his 
land were acts "local in character" and 
that "their effects upon interstate com-
merce are at most 'indirect."' 
Diane Monson lives in California. 
She has been growing marijuana she 
takes to treat substantial medical prob-
lems. The California Compassionate 
Use Act of 1996 exempts from criminal 
liability "patients ... who possess or 
cultivate marijuana for medicinal pur-
poses with the recommendation or ap-
proval of a physician." However, the 
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federal Controlled Substances Act clas-
sifies marijuana as a "Schedule I" drug. 
Such drugs have a "high potential for 
abuse" and no "accepted medical use," 
and it is a federal crime to manufacture, 
distribute, or possess them. 
Diane Monson (with Angel Raich, 
another patient using marijuana) went 
to court to argue that Alberto Gonzales, 
the Attorney General, could not enforce 
the CSA against her or her doctors be-
cause Congress lacks authority to regu-
late the marijuana she grows for her 
own use. Ms. Monson argued that the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize 
Congress to "prohibit the local cultiva-
tion and use of marijuana in compli-
ance with California law." 
In 1942, Wickard v. Filburn reached 
the Supreme Court. The Justices agreed 
that the AAA was constitutional. They 
quoted Chief Justice Harlan Stone: 
"The commerce power is not confined 
in its exercise to the regulation of com-
merce among the states. It extends to 
those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce ... as to make reg-
ulation of them appropriate means to 
the attainment of a legitimate end." 
Thus, "even if appellee's activity be local 
and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still ... be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce." 
Mr. Filburn's wheat affected interstate 
commerce because it kept him from 
buying somebody else's wheat. And 
while his crop was small, its effect, 
"taken together with that of many oth-
ers similarly situated, is far from trivial." 
On June 6 of this year, Justices de-
cided six to three that Congress may 
regulate Ms. Monson's marijuana gar-
den. Justice Stevens said for the Court 
that the Commerce Clause was "the 
Framers' response to the central prob-
lem giving rise to the Constitution it-
self: the absence of any federal com-
merce power under the Articles of Con-
federation." Thus the Commerce 
Clause power is capacious, and "case 
law firmly establishes Congress' power 
to regulate purely local activities that are 
part of an economic 'class of activities' 
that have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce." 
The principle of stare decisis obliges 
American courts to decide similar cases 
similarly. Raich virtually was Wickard. 
"Like the farmer in Wickard, respon-
dents are cultivating, for home con-
sumption, a fungible commodity for 
which there is an established, albeit ille-
gal, interstate market. Just as the AAA 
controlled the amount of wheat in in-
terstate and foreign commerce, "a pri-
mary purpose of the CSA is to control 
the supply and demand of controlled 
substances in both lawful and unlawful 
drug markets." 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O'Connor and Thomas in-
voked two recent cases that examined 
statutes enacted on the authority of the 
Commerce Clause. In 1995, United 
States v. Lopez held that the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded 
Congress's authority. That law made it a 
crime to have a gun near a school. The 
Court said that the Act was "a criminal 
statute that ... has nothing to do with 
commerce or any sort of economic en-
terprise, however broadly one might de-
fine those terms," and the Court there-
fore held that the Act violated the Com-
merce Clause. In 2000, United States v. 
Morrison similarly found the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 unconsti-
tutional. That law "created a federal 
civil remedy for the victims of gender-
motivated crimes of violence." Despite 
"congressional findings that such crimes 
had an adverse impact on interstate 
commerce, we held the statute uncon-
stitutional because, like the statute in 
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Lopez, it did not regulate economic ac-
tivity." 
The majority thought Lopez and 
Morrison sufficiently different from 
Wickard and Raich that they could be 
decided differently. The latter cases in-
volved "quintessentially economic" 
acts-producing, distributing, and con-
suming commodities that had an estab-
lished interstate market-while the for-
mer cases involved not economic activi-
ty, but crimes of violence. The former 
cases affected interstate commerce prox-
imately; the latter only remotely. 
The dissenters, on the other hand, 
thought Raich was closer to Lopez and 
Morrison than Wickard. They doubted 
that raising marijuana for one's own 
medical use is "economic" activity. Even 
if it is, they said, it is not economic ac-
tivity that perceptibly affects any nation-
al market: 'There is simply no evidence 
that homegrown medicinal marijuana 
users constitute, in the aggregate, a siz-
able enough class to have a discernable, 
let alone substantial, impact on the na-
tional illicit drug market." Problems 
would arise only if marijuana were di-
verted to illegal uses. Would that hap-
pen? Not in Justice O'Connor's eyes: 
"We generally assume states enforce 
their laws." ("'If the law supposes that,' 
said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat em-
phatically in both hands, 'the law is a 
ass-a idiot."') 
The dissent, then, thought Congress 
had not shown that interstate commerce 
was sufficiently affected. But, the major-
ity said, Congress need not make such a 
showing. Congress only needs a "ratio-
nal basis" for anticipating a sufficient ef-
fect on commerce. The CSA as a whole 
plainly affected interstate commerce. It 
mattered not that, sliced fine enough, 
individual slivers did not. 
More broadly, the majority thought, 
the dissent "overlook[ed] the larger con-
text of modern-era Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence." In the early New Deal, 
the Court used the Commerce Clause 
(and the Due Process Clause) to savage 
New Deal legislation. New Dealers 
protested that the Justices were abusing 
these ambiguous clauses to promote 
their own political views and class inter-
ests. By the late 1930s, the Court was 
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chastened, and Wickard was part of its 
pledge of repentance and promise of re-
form. During the civil rights movement, 
again, Congress wanted to reach in-
trastate behavior once more. Again it 
found authority in the Commerce 
Clause, and again the Court interpreted 
that authority generously. 
"Scarcely any political question arises 
in the United States that is not resolved, 
sooner or later, into a judicial question," 
Tocqueville said. So when judges decide 
legal questions, they appear to be an-
swering political questions. The press 
coverage of Raich, for instance, regularly 
treats the case as a ruling on the policy 
of legalizing marijuana for medical pur-
poses. 
Judges see their work differently. 
They too have limited powers. Their as-
signment is only to decide whether gov-
ernment has acted within the scope of 
its constitutional authority. As the Raich 
majority said, "The question before us 
... is not whether it is wise to enforce 
the [CSA] in these circumstances; rather 
it is whether Congress' power to regulate 
interstate markets for medicinal sub-
stances encompasses the portions of 
those markets that are supplied with 
drugs produced and consumed locally." 
As Justice O'Connor said in dissent, 
"[I] f I were a California legislator I 
would not have supported the Compas-
sionate Use Act. But whatever the wis-
dom of California's experiment ... , the 
federal principles that have driven our 
Commerce Clause cases require that 
room for experiment be protected in 
this case." 
Far from imagining it has resolved 
the debate over marijuana policy, the 
Raich majority thinks that political 
question is open: The CSA "authorizes 
[administrative] procedures for the re-
classification of Schedule I drugs. But 
perhaps even more important than these 
legal avenues is the democratic process, 
in which the voices of voters allied with 
these respondents may one day be heard 
in the halls of Congress." 
To the Court, then, Raich is not a 
medical marijuana case any more than 
Wickard was a wheat case. Raich is a fed-
eralism case. When the Justices received 
the case, they said, "Wow, here's 
Wickard v. Filburn, an old friend from 
law school," not ''At last, here's the med-
ical marijuana problem." When they 
read the briefs, heard the oral argument, 
and drafted their opinions, they were re-
peatedly brought back to two centuries 
of cases interpreting the Commerce 
Clause-to Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, 
and their kith and kin. The justices had 
to think and to write in terms of those 
cases. 
Raich and its forebears are about con-
stitutional law in its core sense-about 
how American government is constitut-
ed. Allocating authority between the 
federal and state governments has been 
central to the compromises that made a 
"United States of America'' possible, to 
the battles between Hamiltonians and 
Jeffersonians, the Civil War, the re-
sponse to industrialization, the struggle 
over civil rights, and policy today. Thus 
Justice O'Connor's dissent begins, "We 
enforce the 'outer limits' of Congress' 
Commerce Clause authority not for 
their own sake, but to protect historic 
spheres of state sovereignty from exces-
sive federal encroachment and thereby 
to maintain the distribution of power 
fundamental to our federalist system of 
government." A federalist vision of 
states as laboratories of democracy en-
couraged the Court in Washington v. 
Glucksberg to leave states free to permit 
or prohibit assisted suicide. Next term in 
Gonzales v. Oregon the Court will assess 
the Attorney General's authority under 
the CSA-and hence the Commerce 
Clause-to regulate the use of drugs for 
assisted suicide. 
Still, the majority and minority in 
Raich may not be desperately far apart. 
They presumably agree that the Com-
merce Clause grants Congress impres-
sive scope. They presumably agree that 
federal power has some limits. They dis-
agree within the uncertain borderland 
surrounding those limits, a borderland 
they negotiate guided by Delphic-
tongued oracles-clauses that are majes-
tically vague and precedents that offer 
analogies but not rules. Raich has now 
joined Wickard as one of those oracles in 
the unending effort to define the limited 
powers of the federal government. 
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